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Abstract 
Recent increased attention to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has opened investors and the 
general public to the realm of digital currency. Greater exposure around the world has led to a 
frenzy of entry into the market and a test into the long-term feasibility of Bitcoin being able to 
remain a functioning peer-to-peer (P2P), decentralized currency. Its main structure is supported 
by the Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocol in which users can elect to participate in determining 
transaction approval and ensuring an honest blockchain. This system relies on elected users, or 
miners, to expend great computational power and energy in order to solve puzzles to prove the 
accuracy of the network’s transactions and create new blocks, to then be rewarded with newly 
created Bitcoins for their effort.  
 
Each cryptocurrency uses their own method to ensure blockchain accuracy, and this paper will 
focus on how a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol is a superior algorithm to PoW by assigning 
mining ability equal to one’s stake within a coin, rather than her energy consumption, among 
other factors. We will discuss Bitcoin and PoW as a baseline for our eventual analysis of PoS in 
terms of advantages and performance metrics. The main factors that can be compared between 
the two protocols is how each system can prevent itself against a variety of attacks from 
adversarial users within the network, as well as long-term sustainability. Vulnerabilities in any 
network protocol can result in adversaries being able to alter the blockchain for their own 
benefit, at the expense of the majority.  
 
Finally, we will use the Cardano (ADA) cryptocurrency by IOHK as a practical case study for 
understanding how their Ouroborous Praos PoS protocol works. Our goal is to show how long-
term adoption of PoS framework is more realistic from an energy perspective than PoW, 
however inherent risks still exist within the algorithm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Emergence and History of Digital Currency 
 While the emergence of Bitcoin in recent years has piqued the conversation for a 
decentralized monetary system, the concept of a non-traditional digital currency can be observed 
as early as 1983. David Chaum, a cryptographer from the University of California, Berkeley, 
first published a research paper which discussed the viability of anonymous communication, 
followed by a publication on a secure digital cash proposal. His work also included various 
cryptographic protocols which eventually led to the founding of DigiCash, an electronic money 
company based out of Amsterdam which lasted until the late 1990’s (Griffith, 2014).  
 The focus of Chaum’s initial 1981 research is the proposal for an anonymous 
communication network using public keys to encrypt payments in an “envelope”. These 
networks function with a group of senders presenting an encrypted message and the desired 
recipient to the initial server. The initial server will take the message and add layers of masks 
which must be solved by the recipient in order to understand the contents of the envelope 
(Chaum, 1983). 
 We will discuss the viability of a PoS based protocol for a Blockchain ledger as a 
response to the limitations of bitcoin and other PoW cryptocurrencies for long-term energy 
reduction. The main improvement with a PoS system is a matter of lower overall energy 
consumption and mining requirements. In order to “mine” a coin to approve transactions and 
increase the public ledger, the PoW miner must invest large amounts of capital into both 
computational hardware and electricity. The greater computational (or “hash”) power a miner 
has, the better chance she has to receiving a block and obtaining her miner fee. Simply put, the 
ability to have influence and power within a PoW-blockchain is independent of one’s holdings 
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within the particular cryptocurrency. Later, we will find this as a flaw in PoW due to the various 
types of “attacks” to be considered if an elected block is assigned to an adversarial miner. We 
define an adversarial miner as one who looks to disrupt the present blockchain by signing her 
private key to an incorrect ledger. A move in this manner would allow the adversary to falsify 
the blockchain for her own benefit, and allow for double spending. 
 
1.2 Definition and Importance of Distributed Consensus  
 
 To understand the goal of decentralized currency, one must first recognize the importance 
of the term distributed consensus. This term is the problem that is required to be solved under 
blockchain protocol such as Bitcoin to ensure that transactions are considered valid and good. 
We define distributed consensus therefore as a “global agreement between many mutually 
distrusting parties who lack identities and were not necessarily present at the time of system set 
up” (Poelstra, 2015). Per the original writings on the Bitcoin protocol, discussed later, distributed 
consensus can be achieved within the blockchain network by order-time of transactions 
(Nakomoto, 2009). So long as a transaction can be agreed by multiple parties to have occurred at 
a given time, any secondary transaction attempting to use the same coin value later on can be 
determined invalid. Bitcoin differs as the majority of parties are assumed to be trust-worthy and 
honest, but agrees with the anonymity aspect as users are masked within the system and its 
cryptography helps to ensure authentication of its currency (Poelstra, 2018).  
 
1.3 Virtual Currency vs. Digital Currency 
 It is important to note the differences between some common phrasing used to describe 
any non-physical type of currency, so we will identify how virtual currency and digital currency 
alter from one another. The variation in meaning exists similarly to the relationship between 
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squares and rectangles; all squares are rectangles, however not all rectangles are squares. In our 
case, all virtual currencies are digital, but not all digital are virtual. Virtual currencies are 
considered to be used in cases for entertainment and gaming purposes in online worlds that do 
not deal with real-life. These currencies are unable to be exchanged for real assets, and exist 
solely in a “fun” nature to be dealt in game settings (Wagner, 2014). Centralization and 
authoritative power is a major component to virtual currencies in games, as there is normally one 
group in charge of the money supply (i.e. developers) that can increase or decrease the money 
supply on a moment’s notice by changing price of goods or reward structures in the game. Users 
could still exchange this “fake” money for real assets or cash in real-life for game usage, 
however it can lead to legal concerns as there is tax jurisdiction on the virtual currency normally 
(Wagner, 2014). 
 Digital currencies provide far more application ability for users than the value of virtual 
currencies, with the main differences being decentralization of the money supply and redemption 
value for real assets. Bitcoin meets the requirements as its money supply is not controlled by any 
central bank, but rather is supported by the users within the system, and its coin supply is a 
product of market demand (Hankin, 2018). Online retailers have now begun to accept Bitcoin as 
a method of payment for transactions, with Overstock.com leading the movement. As of May 
2017, the site reported that its Bitcoin sales had tripled and they are bringing in $5 million 
annually from its payment usage. Consumers have an incentive to use cryptocurrency for larger 
transactions in which money needs to be moved quickly, and they can exploit the lack of taxation 
present with purchases (Mulqueen, 2018). Use of digital currencies for these deals also allows 
for the avoidance of unnecessary third-party transaction fees that we must account for when 
using other payment methods, such as credit cards, to guarantee the validity of the transaction. 
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1.4 Background on Bitcoin and Double Spend Example 
 In 2008, a user with the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakomoto released the Bitcoin white 
paper, outlining the purpose for their creation of the cryptocurrency. He states that the concept of 
the coin is for “a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to 
be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution” 
(Nakomoto, 2009). Under normal conditions, an exchange of money on the internet between two 
parties will require the use of a financial institution (FI). For example, if Alice wishes to pay Bob 
online, she will use her debit or credit card to complete the transaction. An FI will then be 
responsible for removing money from Alice’s account, and crediting the balance to Bob’s 
account.  
 Nakomoto argues that this process is inefficient in that we depend on these FI’s to act as 
trusted-third parties, which in turn increases transaction costs in the long-run. He defines this 
weakness as a result of the trust based model. Banks and FI’s cannot promise totally non-
reversible transactions as there will always be a need for mediation in the event of fraud. Thus, 
we see transactions costs rise as FI’s require more information from customers in order to 
increase levels of trust when completing virtual payments. The trust based model can be ignored 
when dealing with payments of physical currency (i.e. cash, gold, etc.), as the proof of payment 
exists to the recipient at the time of transaction (Nakomto, 2009).  
 The belief is that Bitcoin can alleviate the requirement of a third-party for transactions 
over a communications channel, such as the internet, on the basis of cryptography rather than 
trust. Say for instance that Alice and Bob agree to make a transaction online, and the payment 
will be made via check. Alice only has enough in her bank account for this one order. Bob trusts 
Alice, and tells her that so long as she tells him the tracking number of the envelope once she 
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mails it, he will send her goods. Alice follows the orders, and receives confirmation from Bob 
that her order has shipped. However, Alice also enters into an identical agreement with Charlie, 
and neither seller knows of the other transaction. Alice now has two checks in the mail, yet only 
one can be successfully cashed due to her lack of funds. Bob and Charlie will both use their bank 
as a trusted third-party for this transaction, and the only successful transaction will be for 
whichever seller goes to the bank first. One seller has now experienced the failure in the trust 
based model, and will have to now deal with the bank to mediate the situation. Alice has 
successfully completed double spending, and now has her two orders for the cost of one. We will 
discuss the concept of double spending later on, and how cryptography prevents this problem. 
 
1.5 Cryptography Within Bitcoin Transactions 
 By using cryptography to prove the order of transactions, sellers like Bob and Charlie 
would be protected from fraud as the ability to reverse a transaction is lost, and customers could 
be insured with escrow techniques. This peer-to-peer systems functions without the need for a 
third-party, and utilizes timestamps to ensure the proper order of transactions and prevent users 
like Alice from completing double spending (Nakomoto, 2009). Since Bitcoin transactions and 
the ledger are public, users are assigned a unique string of characters to identify themselves, 
known as a bitcoin address, which ensures anonymity (Böhme, Christin, Edelman, & Moore, 
2015). To complete a transaction, users enter the address of the recipient rather than any 
information which could lead to public identification on the ledger. In order for the transaction to 
be considered “good”, computers (nodes) on the system will complete complex mathematics 
problems to ensure the chronology of the ledger is correct, and that the sender is not committing 
double spending.  
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 Transferring ownership of a coin in the Bitcoin system relies on a compilation of digital 
signatures from an owner to a payee. In order to create a transaction in this system, the following 
order must be preserved (Kroll, Davey, & Felten, 2014): 
 Create a hash of the owner’s last transaction and payee’s public key 
 The owner must digitally sign this hash using their private key 
 Signature is then added to the end of the coin 
 Payee can verify that the signature of the now previous owner is true 
 Payee now becomes the new owner of the coin 
 
 This cycle is then repeated infinitely many times as the coin continues to change 
ownership within the Bitcoin system. However, according to Nakomoto this sequence in itself 
does not ensure protection against double spending, as the payee is unable to know if the 
previous owner of their coin engaged in double spending. To ensure the validity of the 
transaction, there needs to be a method to check each transaction. The ironic solution first 
discussed by Nakomoto is the concept of a central “mint”, which requires coins to pass through a 
third-party in the system to provide proof that no double spending occurred. This solution is 
impractical, as whatever company responsible for running the mint would act as a central bank, 
which is counterintuitive to Bitcoin’s strategy of decentralization (Nakomoto, 2009).  
 Instead, the proposed method for transaction approval involves posting all of these 
records to a public ledger or blockchain, which allows us to remove the need for a trusted third-
party. Using the Bitcoin blockchain in conjunction with timestamping requires the 
implementation of the proof-of-work (PoW) protocol for distributed consensus within the system. 
 
2. Proof-of-Work (PoW) Protocol 
2.1 Overview and Definition  
 The proof-of-work protocol in cryptocurrency requires users to expand a level of energy 
in order to solve a computational puzzle to extend the blockchain, referred to as mining. In 
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practice, the benefit to using computational puzzles to determine consensus within the peer-to-
peer network is two-fold. First, completion of a PoW puzzle requires access to large 
computational power and a high level of energy usage, which creates the concept of difficulty for 
users in the system. Power and difficulty of these problems increases as the number of bitcoins in 
circulation approaches its maximum supply of 21 million coins. As of April 2018, MarketWatch 
estimates that there are approximately 16.9 million in existence, meaning only 20% remain to be 
created (Hankin, 2018). Although this makes the PoW protocol more expensive over time, this 
helps to guarantee that the user, or miner, of the block has put forth adequate effort to continue 
consensus within the blockchain, and allow for honest branches from the original genesis block 
(Kroll, Davey, & Felten, 2014).  
 
2.2 Hashing to Solve for Zero-Bits Requirement 
 The second advantage in a PoW system is the ease by which the result can be verified. 
According to Nakomoto, PoW computations aim to find a value whose resulting hash has a 
targeted number of “zero bits”. Each block receives an incremental nonce which is used to test 
whether or not the resulting hash has the desired number of zero bits. (Nakomoto, 2009) A nonce 
in the bitcoin system is defined as a 4-byte field that acts as the variable solver within a PoW 
puzzle. Since the other fields within the PoW puzzle all have a “defined” meaning, we cannot 
change their values to solve for the correct number of zero bits.  The nonce must therefore be 
changed many times to different values in order to solve the PoW puzzle, requiring exponentially 
more energy with each additional zero bit required (increase in puzzle difficulty). After the 
computer proves it has solved the puzzle and expended the required effort, the block is unable to 
be changed unless a computer is to re-do this process for the given block and each additional 
block chained thereafter. This is considered an easy verification for hash results on each block, 
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as success is defined simply by whether the computer’s effort leads to a match with the hash of 
the problem. 
 
Figure 1: We observe each new block as using the hash of the previous 
timestamp as a starting point, as well as the variable nonce submitted to test 
for zero-bits. Tx refers to each transaction filed recorded under each block. 
This nonce allows us to create timestamping within the blockchain network 
(courtesy of Nakomoto, 2008). 
 
  We can then define that a new block is only considered a beneficial addition to the chain 
if its resulting hash is less than a target value set within the blockchain itself, and higher hash 
value results are ignored. If twelve consecutive zero-bits are required but our hash only has 
eleven, the computer is not determined to have completed the PoW puzzle.  Bitcoin assumes in 
its PoW system that mining will continue on the longest branch of the blockchain (most valid). 
Miners can be seen as the working arm within the peer-to-peer bitcoin network that allows for 
transaction approval for participants.  
 
2.3 Computational Energy Needed for Mining 
 Since there is a cost and energy requirement to mine a block, miners are motivated to 
expend resources on the most correct (longest) branch. According to MarketWatch, in 2018 the 
overall cost of bitcoin mining is staggering. The Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index (BECI) 
estimates that global energy usage in bitcoin mining is equivalent to the power required to 
sustain the entire country of Denmark with its population of 5.7 million people. Since the 
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computational power required to mine increases as supply decreases, energy use is expected to 
rise to equal the uptake of Bangladesh with over 160 million residents (Hankin, 2018). 
 
2.4 Profit Inequality and Arbitrage Opportunity for Miners 
 Since energy costs and accessibility to renewable power varies greatly among different 
countries, miner profit is not equal. Miner pay is therefore contingent on a few primary variables: 
the energy cost required to mine one bitcoin, the trading price of bitcoin, and the incentive for 
completion of a block. The United States ranks 41st in the world for bitcoin mining costs, 
averaging $4,758 a coin, and the current bitcoin value is just over $8,000 USD per coin (Hankin, 
2018). Thus, miners will only make a profit when the value of bitcoin exceeds the energy 
consumption costs. New York-based firm Fundstart estimates that on average bitcoin is now 
trading at its breakeven cost, leaving miners with little to no room for profit. Miners then in this 
case will no longer be motivated or incentivized by financial benefits to mining, but rather the 
intrinsic duty of maintaining the validity of the blockchain unless a transaction fee can be 
assigned for block creation (Hankin, 2018, Nakomoto, 2008).  
 Energy consumption for mining therefore presents the ability for arbitrage by miners 
located in different countries. If Alice mines via PoW in Venezuela at an average price of 
$531/coin and Bob mines in Iceland at $4,746/coin, assuming a base bitcoin value of $8,000 will 
result in very different profits (Hankin, 2018). Alice will have greater monetary gain by 
exploiting lower electricity costs in Venezuela, even though her and Bob are both completing 
similar-level difficulty puzzles for the same end reward. One must obviously consider other 
transaction costs such as the expense to relocate oneself for mining, however the point remains. 
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2.5 Incentives for Network Support and Inflation Control 
  We now discuss how the payoff to miners for their efforts can help to support the 
network integrity and act as an inflation-proof reward structure after all coins have been issued 
into circulation. Upon creation of a new block by Alice, she will now own the new coin put into 
circulation as a result of her computational effort expended. Nakomoto believes that 
incentivizing PoW miners such as Alice in this manner encourages more users to act as nodes in 
the system and is a successful method of decentralized coin issuance (Nakomoto, 2009). She 
equates this to the concept of how gold is able to be brought into circulation-namely of how gold 
miners must expend time and effort (computational power and electricity) to increase the active 
supply of gold. Both Bitcoin and gold have a finite supply to ever be issued, and both are 
dependent on effort as the backbone for cultivation.  
 The PoW protocol of Bitcoin improves the likelihood of honest activity among nodes as 
well, even if an adversarial miner was to gain control of the blockchain in a rare situation. While 
this would require a vast amount of computational power and energy to overhaul all honest 
nodes in the system, which we will discuss in more detail later, the adversary would be forced to 
choose how they wish to use their siege. The attacker could attempt to steal back money from 
transactions she has already committed (i.e. Alice with Bob and Charlie), but she would achieve 
greater profit by continuing the blockchain and getting rewarded with new coins for each block 
created. (Nakomoto, 2009). The marginal benefit to furthering consensus on the blockchain 
therefore is independent of one’s honesty desires-both types of miners are encouraged to 
continue the blockchain.  
 Transaction fees can also be incorporated within the PoW mining incentive so that each 
node in the system can still benefit after all coins have entered circulation. The transaction fee is 
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calculated as the resulting amount present if the input value is greater than the output value of a 
transaction. Nakomoto declares that this fee can be added to the reward value of the overall 
block containing the transaction, and is inflation-proof (Nakomoto, 2009). Since the amount of 
coins is finite and our initial PoW incentive structure is violated after all 21 million coins are 
issued, these transaction fees will provide motivation to nodes to remain active (Böhme, Christin, 
Edelman, & Moore, 2015). Inflation is avoided as the supply will never change once the cap has 
been hit, so the value of a transaction fee on d day (assuming all coins are circulated) will be 
equal to the transaction fee n days after. Maintaining a constant reward structure after all coins 
are issued then mean adversarial nodes have less profit available to them, should they be able to 
raise enough energy and power to outdo all honest nodes. 51% attacks (discussed later) and 
double spending in this case are limited to profit only equal to reversing the money one has sent.  
 
Figure 2: As each increment of 210,000 blocks are created, the reward 
(issuance) of coin per block decreases for the miner. The limit is defined as 
the total possible circulation of Bitcoin coins, where a transition to strictly 
transaction-fee rewards will exist with zero inflation. Note: Given this 
graph, 2018 circulation falls just below the trend line (courtesy of Quora).  
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2.6 Likelihood for Adversarial Disruption 
 While PoW struggles from an energy perspective, it has shown evidence through Bitcoin 
of the minute likelihood of blockchain disruption by dishonest nodes. Nakomoto defines the 
competition by a dishonest node to create a differing chain against a series of honest nodes to be 
equal to a Binomial Random Walk. Should the attacker succeed in generating a new block on 
their alternate chain, this is deemed a failure under the random walk as the honest node lead is 
cut down by 1. The same principle exists if we are to consider the successful event to be an 
honest node placing the next block on the chain, increasing their lead by 1 over the attacking 
miner (Nakomoto, 2009). The benefit to the PoW system in this case is that should the dishonest 
attacker succeed in getting the next block on her chain, it does not mean failure for the network 
as a whole. Assuming the majority of nodes are honest in verifying the correct blockchain, this 
alternate chain made by the attacker will fail to be verified and agreed upon overall. The attacker 
is unable to ever get money or coin that never belonged to her, so the only reward for her 
computational effort would be to retrieve the money she has already spent. This aligns with the 
incentive structure mentioned previously, as it is more worthwhile for a node to remain honest 
for their own benefit in order to collect the new coins issued upon block creation and ownership. 
 Calculating the potential of an attacker to catch up to an honest node to create a 
branching blockchain for her own benefit and double spend is modeled with the following 
simplified function and constraints set in place: 
 𝑞𝑧 = {
1, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑞
(𝑞 𝑝⁄ )𝑧, 𝑝 > 𝑞
 
Where: 
p is equal to the probability that an honest node gets the following block 
q is equal to the probability that an attacker gets the following block  
z is equal to the number of blocks behind the attacking is from the honest 
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 If the chance the attacker can reach the next block is greater than or equal to that of an 
honest node, the ability for the attacker to breakeven with the honest chain is 1. Regardless of 
whether the attacker can reach this probability over an honest node in the beginning, she will 
statistically be exponentially unfavored to ever catch up again. The dishonest node would need to 
have the ability to constantly outwork the honest nodes to have any chance at establishing their 
alternate chain and completing double spend to scam a recipient. Our second constraint depicts 
the more common outcome should the probability the honest node wins is greater than that of a 
dishonest node. Since our exponent is in terms of z, as the attacker falls further behind in number 
of blocks, the difficulty to breakeven with the honest chain increases substantially for each 
additional block (Nakomoto, 2009).  
 However, since completing a false transaction is dependent on the dishonest attacker 
attempting to send and then recall her money via double spend, time plays a factor in the success 
chance for the scam to occur. We define the process for this falsified action to occur in terms of 
goals for the sender: 
1. Alice would like to buy her goods from Bob, and she agrees to send him Bitcoin as 
payment, even though she has plans to scam and try to reverse the transaction. 
 
2. Alice plans to send the coin to Bob, and prepare an identical replicate chain in private 
to send the money back to herself before the transaction is posted to an honest block. 
 
3. If she is able to get far enough ahead in the PoW process as compared to the honest 
nodes, she can reverse the transaction to return her money in hopes that Bob has 
already shipped her goods.  
 
4. This is the equivalency of our initial analogy to a bounced check if we were to 
consider Alice knowing exactly when a bank would attempt to cash her check by 
knowing where it stood in line for the hypothetical “queue”. She could call and cancel 
the payment before it can execute as she was able to get ahead of the honest system 
(the bank ledger), and Bob has already sent the goods. 
 
 The attacker can have an advantage should she already know the public key of the 
receiver for the transaction, as blocks could be prepared in advance before signature occurs. By 
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having these blocks prepared in a “parallel” blockchain, the attacker could then execute the 
transaction at the exact moment that she beats out the honest chain. Instead, to increase security 
for the honest receiver and raise the difficulty level for the attacker (sender) according to 
Nakomoto’s function, the receiver will create a new pair of public and private keys for the 
transaction. Granting the sender, one’s public key right before signing allows the honest nodes to 
retain the assumed advantage for the next block over the attacker to the network.  
 Alice, in this case, would execute the transaction to send Bob an amount of Bitcoin, and 
then have to race to catch up to the honest blockchain to create a different version to the 
transaction in which her money is returned to her address (Nakomoto, 2009). Bob then will then 
check to ensure his transaction has been posted to a block and that z blocks are chained thereafter 
by honest nodes. Thus, Alice must then not only replicate the work of the block in which this 
transaction occurs, but each following block too if she wishes to publish her desired version of 
the blockchain. If we assume the average target block time in the Bitcoin PoW network to be, 
say 10 minutes, holds true for this transaction, we can estimate the potential progress of Alice’s 
alternate chain. Many new cryptocurrencies claim shorter block target times, but this will still 
work for our analysis. 
Let’s assume it’s been 30 minutes, so three blocks have been chained after the block 
holding Alice and Bob’s transaction, so z would be equal to 3. In general, Bob cannot 
know for certain Alice’s progress, but can estimate how far behind she is with the 
following Poisson density equation: 
 
𝜆 = 𝑧
𝑞
𝑝
 
 
For a more simplified version to calculate Alice’s current probability of catching up, 
we calculate the product of the Poisson density for each possible progress made by 
Alice for z blocks by the probability of catching up to that same z blocks given Alice’s 
progress of k: 
 
1 − ∑
𝜆𝑘𝑒−𝜆
𝑘!
𝑧
𝑘=0
(1 − (𝑞 𝑝)⁄ (𝑧−𝑘)) 
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Beginning with the right-side parentheses, we observe that our exponent reflects the 
difference between how many blocks behind Alice is and her blocks created thus far 
in her parallel blockchain. We take q divided by p raised to the difference between z 
and k given the constraint that k is less than or equal to z. If k had managed to be 
greater than z, then we would assume Alice to have a probability to catch up equal to 
1 in terms of gaining ground on the honest node.  
 
Subtracting these two values from each other gives us the probability Alice could 
catch up from the current point. Our fraction measures the Poisson density raised to 
the power of Alice’s block progress w, times the mathematical constant e raised to the 
negative Poisson density, all over the factorial of k. Summing our results from the 
assumption Alice has made zero progress to the current breakeven value of z, we get 
our probability that Alice cannot catch up to the chain’s current position. Subtracting 
by one gives us our final answer as to her true probability of breaking even to reverse 
the transaction on Bob. 
 
 Running this equation via script shows favorable results for Bob and other receivers in 
the Bitcoin PoW network when dealing with senders such as Alice. The following results are 
those released by Nakomoto in the original publishing of Bitcoin’s proposal to the public, and 
assumes two rates for q for the attacker: 10% and 30%. Even at a higher probability of securing 
the next block, the likelihood in breaking even decreases exponentially as z rises. Assuming that 
Bob obeys by our assumptions to issue a new public key to Alice before the transaction, and that 
all other energy and block time requirements are kept intact, we find it extremely unlikely that 
Alice will be able to complete double spend through PoW. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Assuming two different values for q, Alice still will face poor 
probability of catching up to the honest blockchain given her current 
progress in either scenario. PoW under the Bitcoin system provides 
transaction recipients with confidence that the sender would need extreme 
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computational power and energy to call back a payment (courtesy of 
Nakomoto, 2009). 
 
 PoW has shown us that validity in a transaction comes from proof that energy was 
consumed via computational work to solve a problem in order to create a block, and provides 
sound protection against double spending by senders. Nodes show their allegiance and support 
to the decentralized system by using energy in order to participate in the incentives issued to 
miners of new blocks, including small transaction fees paid out once the limit of coins are in 
circulation. Nodes are therefore motivated to remain honest due to the investment set forth to 
complete these proofs, and how the system is designed to punish those who attempt to 
outwork honest miners for double spending, such as Alice.  
 However, the energy requirement for PoW support in a standalone network such as 
Bitcoin is not feasible for long-term usage once the cost to mine a coin outweighs the marginal 
benefit (value of the coin), as we have already seen in certain areas of the world. In an attempt to 
mitigate this concern and lower energy for distributed consensus in decentralized currencies, we 
must consider the viability of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols found in newer generation 
cryptocurrencies, such as our case study of Cardano (ADA).  
 
3. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Protocol 
3.1 Overview and Definition 
 The concept behind PoS was originally proposed on a message board online in late 
2011, and more formalized in a paper outlining a new cryptocurrency, “PPCoin” or Peercoin, 
in 2012 (“The History and Evolution”, 2018). Sunny King and Scott Nadal, the founders of 
the idea, express that PoS is inspired as a hybrid conjunction with Nakomoto’s PoW design in 
Bitcoin, but with a focus on reducing overall energy costs when verifying transactions (King 
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& Nadal, 2012). Instead, Peercoin was built on the premise that coin age can be the basis of 
the PoS design and improve security of the network overall. We define coin age as the amount 
of currency (number of coins) times holding period value (i.e. 30 coins held for 100 days 
returns a coin age of 3,000 coin-days). Once the coins have been used, the system declares 
that the “accumulated coin-age has been consumed” (King & Nadal, 2012). To validate our 
calculation of coin-age, a timestamp is attached to each transaction within the protocol. 
Consider the example of Alice, Bob and Charlie once again: 
1. Alice would like to buy her goods from Bob, and she agrees to engage in a PoS based 
transaction such as Peercoin for her payment method. Since we define coin age as 
equal to the product of n days times c amount of coins, let us determine her total coin 
age before this transaction is 5 coins held for 10 days. Alice has a coin age of 500. 
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume her total Peercoin value equals her obligation 
to Bob. 
 
2. Alice plans to send her 5 coins to Bob to pay for her goods, but also wishes to 
complete a double-spend and replicate the same transaction with Charlie. Consider 
that neither Bob nor Charlie knows of the other transaction. 
 
3. Alice initiates her transaction to pay Bob 5 coins, which creates a timestamp for the 
blockchain that will determine the validity of her transaction. Her coin age of 500 is 
now “consumed” and lost, therefore showing her ownership has been transferred. Any 
additional attempt by Alice to send these same coins to Charlie should be disallowed 
by the PoS protocol by observing the timestamp of her first transaction.  
 
4. Alice is unable to complete double spend, assuming honest activity among the nodes 
within the blockchain. Since coin age is dependent upon accumulation of a certain 
holding period of d days, this makes the coin difficult to counterfeit. 
 
5. Bob receives the payment and begins to accumulate his own coin age on the coins, to 
which he can then transfer to another party should he decide. He can feel confident in 
this transaction and send Alice her goods, as her loss of stake from this transaction 
shows her original ownership of the currency. Charlie will not receive a payment from 
Alice and will therefore refuse to send her the goods. 
 
 Since PoS protocol favors using one’s overall holdings or “stake” instead of energy 
consumption as an indication that effort was used to verify a transaction, coin-age can help to 
provide this proof of ownership. King and Nadal argue that since coin-age is set up to measure 
based on the time an individual has held the coin since the last transaction, it is difficult to 
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falsify ownership. If a coin is already spent in another transaction, its coin-age has been reset 
to zero, therefore not allowing it to be spent again as it is already “consumed”. Should an 
individual be able to provide proof-of-stake with their coin-age being consumed in a 
transaction, then we can assume this to also be proof of ownership in the currency. This acts 
as a barrier to counterfeiting much like the security aspect of PoW, but with far less energy 
required because it removes much of the steps involved in solving puzzles, which we will 
discuss below (King & Nadal, 2012).  
 Block generation under PoS improves from PoW as it does not involve the infinite 
trial and error of an incremental nonce in order to test if the resulting hash meets the target. As 
of late 2017, it is estimated that in order to generate one new block on the Bitcoin network, a 
node must complete 260 hashes, requiring high amount of energy (Kiayias, Russell, David, & 
Oliynykov, 2017).  Rather, the block creation by Peercoin involves a combination of two 
types of inputs, kernel and stake in an effort to minimize energy usage compared to PoW, and 
will provide a single stake output. First, the block owner will consume their own coin-age by 
completing a payment to oneself, and the reward will be the ability to mint the resulting block 
after proving effort via stake. The need for the kernel input is evolved from PoW to allow for 
PoS block generating to be a process that remains random over time, and is used to help meet 
the hash target set within the protocol (King & Nadal, 2012). 
 Hash target for the kernel in PoS is therefore a target determined by the coin day value 
consumed by the stakeholder, which differs from PoW as the target hash is set equal for each 
node on the network. Simply put, this means nodes that have greater coin-age (stake) will face 
less difficulty in meeting the hash target, and the uniqueness of one’s target relative to coin-
age preserves energy. If I have a coin-age equal to half of Charlie’s, then we can expect 
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Charlie to generate a kernel to meet the hash target in half the time it takes me. This also 
provides incentive for users to accumulate greater stake in the currency to improve their 
chance of securing a block for minting. Say Alice, Bob and Charlie are competing for the 
opportunity to mine a new block under Peercoin PoS: 
1. Alice, Bob and Charlie are among many nodes within the Peercoin system who 
compete to mint a new block for the blockchain. We define their names respectively 
as A, B, C with some coin age c for each, creating Ac, Bc, Cc. Let us assume their 
coin ages are related in such a manner that: 
 
𝐴𝑐 = 2𝐵𝑐 = 4𝐶𝑐 
 
2. Our above equation tells us that Alice’s coin age is equal to double that of Bob, and 
quadruple that of Charlie. We will use each person’s stake shortly in order to 
determine their chance of gaining block generation rights. 
 
3. Each node (Alice, Bob, Charlie) will complete a payment to themselves to consume 
their coin age, therefore proving their stake in the coin at some time t. Depending on 
their coin ages, each node will have a different hash target to meet. This hash target is 
based off Nakomoto’s work in PoW. However, since Alice has a higher coin age than 
both Bob and Charlie, her chances to mint the next block will be greater than both of 
them. 
 
4. Peercoin PoS sets the difficulty of the hash target relative to one’s stake. If Alice can 
prove via a self-consumption of coin age that her age is greater than Bob, her time to 
reach the hash target should be proportionally faster to the relationship between their 
stakes. To reach their hash targets, each will test various kernels, and the first to do so 
successfully will be chosen to generate the next block. 
 
5. In our case, Alice has the greatest proportional stake (coin age), and should therefore 
meet her hash target first. She should finish twice as fast as Bob, and four times as 
fast as Charlie. Users under this PoS therefore are more successful as nodes as their 
overall coin age (proportional stake) increases. 
 
 Under PoW, we acknowledged that as more coins are brought into Bitcoin circulation, 
the block reward is decreased in half each 210,000 blocks before reaching the coin supply 
limit for the currency. When we consider the minimal energy requirement for PoS, 
Nakomoto’s miner reward proves to be an inefficient incentive for long-term decentralized 
support of the PoW network. While PoW nodes are important for coin minting, they are more 
critical to verification of transactions in the Bitcoin network. King and Nadal state that as the 
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marginal reward for coin minting decreases when circulation begins to reach its limit, there is 
less incentive to mine blocks in a PoW framework (King & Nadal, 2012).  
 This statement agrees with our earlier argument that miners will only be motivated to 
expend energy on the system if the cost to do so remains less than the value of the coin. Once 
circulation limit is reached, this would mean PoW transaction fees need to be increased 
drastically to support energy requirements for transaction verification, considering the 
difficulty of PoW problems increase over time. This then transitions the burden of the fee to 
payees such as Alice and Bob, who may then resort to other payment options with lower fees. 
Should honest miners drop off in a PoW system at this point and total energy input fall, a 
security vulnerability arises as verification is tied to miner activity, and provides attackers 
better chances to claim majority control of the energy in the network. 
 Incentive structure for minting of new blocks in this PoS protocol is based on a fixed 
rate reward multiplied by the consumed coin age of the transaction, independent of the 
number of blocks created. For Peercoin, the outline was to set this rate to one cent per coin-
year, as using this low amount as a prevention against high inflation rate going forward (King 
& Nadal, 2012). Nakomoto also accounted for inflation when determining long-term incentive 
for Bitcoin after circulation limit has been achieved, however this structure is better suited in 
the PoS network. Stake nodes will be motivated to continue holding ownership in the coin 
over the long run if they know their reward is dependent on their overall coin age and not with 
energy consumption. Continued node activity will be more feasible under PoS because so 
long as there are individuals willing to participate in the protocol, transactions can be verified 
for the public ledger, regardless of world electricity or technological infrastructure costs. Over 
the years, others have begun to note the practicality in adopting and evolving the objective of 
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distributed consensus via PoS, and we will now examine how Cardano (ADA) by Input 
Output Hong Kong (IOHK) utilizes their own PoS algorithm in practice. 
 
3.2 Cardano ADA Ouroboros Praos Case Study 
 Cardano (ADA) is a third-generation cryptocurrency designed by previous Ethereum 
developer Charles Hoskinson and is currently in circulation on major exchanges such as 
Bittrex and Binance. As stated, their blockchain protocol is referred to as Ouroboros Praos, 
and is defined to be “a provably secure proof-of-stake system…to the best of [our] 
knowledge, this is the first blockchain protocol of its kind with a rigorous security analysis” 
(Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). First, we will discuss the two main goals of the 
Ouroboros PoS algorithm with regards to transaction verification and a truthful ledger: 
persistence and liveliness.  
 
3.2a Persistence and Liveliness as Measures of Stability 
 Persistence can be observed as the theory that once one node decides that a transaction 
is “stable”, all other honest nodes within the blockchain should follow suit. Here, stability is 
reflected by a parameter value k, referring to a chain of however many blocks following the 
event agreed the transaction as honest. If a node is to be queried and report the transaction to 
be in a different position within the ledger or be conflicted by a separate transaction, this is 
where persistence would fail (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). Once the 
transaction has been considered stable by many nodes for a particular number of k blocks, 
stability is assumed. Bitcoin believes its transactions to be true following a similar general 
idea, being that the longest blockchain in existence should be treated as the best, using the 
number of blocks as a determinant (Nakomoto, 2009). Ouroboros supports the consideration 
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of longest chain as well for validity of the network, with some adaption, given that it will 
reflect growth from honest nodes. 
 Liveliness in Ouroboros is dependent on time as its measure, calculating how many 
certain periods have passed that the transaction has been publicly available to the nodes of the 
blockchain. Cardano considers the threshold amount of time required for stability to be equal 
to the transaction confirmation time, or a certain amount of u periods. Combining these two 
measures for transaction history implies confidence that honest nodes have majority control of 
the network and that double-spending was not attempted in a transaction (Kiayias, Russell, 
David, & Oliynykov, 2017). 
 
3.2b Multiparty Coin-Flipping Entropy for Block Generation 
 Compared to Peercoin, the design of the Ouroboros algorithm improves the usage of 
stake to prove transactions within the blockchain. No longer is any computational PoW used 
to determine effort has been expended (kernel). Within this standalone PoS, nodes are now 
chosen, or rather elected, to participate in the communal consensus process by proportion of 
their stake, and randomness determines who becomes a slot leader to have the responsibility 
to create the new block. These nodes are then assigned to given slots which depend on a 
central timestamp, where they must be synced to the system in order to produce the next 
block. One of the major described challenges to creating a secure PoS system, according to 
the Ouroboros documents, is creating the blockchain to allow fair entropy for changing 
stakeholders over time. Since one’s holdings in the currency is not static, there must be a 
method to introduce randomness from within the algorithm itself to assign the next block 
generator, rather than using randomness based on beginning stakes (Kiayias, Russell, David, 
& Oliynykov, 2017). 
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 Designing this randomness for the election process, however, is susceptible to 
adversary computational attack if an attacker oversees multiple nodes with varying stakes, as 
one user can control multiple stakes, called grinding. Although the probability is very low, 
one could argue that theoretically a series of colluding adversaries could be elected to produce 
a series of blocks in a row under the random entropy. This would lead to an incorrect ledger 
and a violation of the protocol. Ouroboros addresses this vulnerability using its coin flipping 
selection to encourage entropy, following these rules: 
- Coin flipping will be a multiparty venture during each epoch 
- An epoch is defined as a regular interval of time within the blockchain when current stakes 
are determined 
- During each epoch, this multiparty random event will be communicated to the blockchain 
as a whole 
- The random stakeholders in this group each epoch will carry out the random coin flipping 
computation to determine the next set of stakeholders in the following epoch, as well as 
the slot leaders for the epoch 
- Grinding is prevented as entropy is used as opposed to computational power to sway 
results 
 
To demonstrate the election process under Ouroboros, let us once again assume that 
Alice, Bob and Charlie would like to act as nodes within the blockchain. Since we are dealing 
with PoS like Peercoin, their participation is assumed to be independent of energy costs or 
other computational power concerns. The election process goes as follows: 
1. Alice, Bob and Charlie are among many nodes within the Ouroboros system who 
compete to mint a new block for the blockchain. We define their names respectively 
as A, B, C with some proportional stake c for each, creating Ac, Bc, Cc for some 
epoch number ui with s many slots. 
 
2. Because stake under this protocol is dynamic (noted later), one’s stake is taken during 
regular periods to determine their ability to be elected to a slot position in the next 
epoch based on first genesis block each epoch. Let there be many slots in each epoch, 
all with short time frames less than 30 seconds each. 
 
3. The previous shareholders elected to participate in ui-1 carry out the coin flipping 
experiment and post their results to the blockchain along with their endorsed slots. 
The coin flippings will determine a value equal to random shareholders that will 
allow each to be elected as a slot leader or input endorser.  
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4. If the value Ac for Alice is 3%, Bc for Bob is 2%, and Cc for Charlie is 0.5%, we note 
the following. Alice will have the best chance of selection under random entropy as 
her stake is greater than Bob. Charlie will not be elected for any position as his stake 
is below the threshold required to participate, which is set at 1%. 
 
5. We acknowledge that a user with some stake above the threshold amount is able to 
participate in the protocol as long as they abide by requirements mentioned later. 
Alice and others with greater stake have better chance of being selected to participate. 
If Alice is chosen, she will gain rights to either endorse inputs to each block in the 
epoch ui, or will be allowed to sign the slot to the blockchain (see below for job 
roles). 
 
3.2c Role Functions of Protocol Participants 
 The outcome of multiparty coin flipping within Ouroborous assigns multiple roles to 
nodes for slot responsibilities, where transaction endorsement is required to allow for block 
generation. We define the major roles in each slot as follows: 
- Slot Leader: This elected node is granted the right to generate the block during a given slot. 
Her probability of being selected for this position is equivalent to her proportion of stake at 
the time of the first (genesis) block within the epoch. 
- Input Endorsers: These individuals within a slot are elected in the same way as Slot 
Leaders, however their role is to endorse the transactions being posted to the new block. 
Blocks are only considered reputable or good if they are endorsed by an input endorser. 
 
 Slot leaders under the Ouroboros algorithm therefore are granted the comparable duty 
to a classic Bitcoin miner, without the race to complete the block against other nodes. Their 
proof of effort in generating the new block for the chain is depicted by their proportional stake 
calculated at the genesis block of the current epoch. If they had insufficient stake to compete 
in the protocol (assumed at 1%) or zero stake at all, they would not be allowed to function as a 
node. Only allowing stakeholders in the currency to submit their block, per approval from 
input endorsers, encourages honesty among slot leaders to protect the validity of the 
blockchain (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). Because probability of role 
assignment remains a function of proportional stake, we consider random selection to be 
representative of the entire network. A user with significant stake only hurts themselves if 
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they wish to act dishonest by participating. Acting in a way that compromises the blockchain 
negatively affects the slot leader as they already have investment in the currency itself, 
mitigating some issues with nothing at stake concerns within PoS infrastructure. Let us 
assume Alice has been chosen to act as a slot leader for some slot in a given epoch, and Bob 
and Charlie have been elected to be input endorsers for her slot: 
1. Bob has used his stake in order to become eligible to participate in the Ouroboros 
protocol and is responsible for endorsing transaction to a block for publication to the 
blockchain. Assuming there is no indication of double spending in this transaction, 
Bob will approve of this as an input to the slot. Under the values of persistence, 
assuming Bob is honest, Charlie should approve of the same transaction. The longer 
the transaction has been broadcasted to the blockchain as well, liveliness should infer 
the transaction is good as well. 
 
2. Once Bob and Charlie, along with the other input endorsers in the slot, have endorsed 
the inputs for final signing by the slot leader Alice, she will approve of the block and 
broadcast her decision to the blockchain. Since Alice is elected to participate based 
upon her stake within the currency, she is encouraged to act rational and honest to 
protect the value of her investment. Failing to approve of a block for her own 
motivations only prohibits an honest blockchain, and dishonesty can lead to a drop-in 
price of the coin. 
 
3. Alice, Bob and Charlie will complete the coin flipping process in order to determine 
the next shareholders in for the slots in the following epoch. Their stakes will once 
again be considered simply out of respect for the random entropy protected under 
Ouroboros. If Alice wanted to act as a dishonest node, the process hinders her ability 
to manipulate the system to choose herself for consecutive blocks as stakes are not 
static and calculated often. 
 
 Input endorsers in Ouroboros are similar to the philosophy of checks-and-balances 
within a decision-making community. Since stakeholders chosen to participate in each slot 
communicate their messages to the blockchain, this improves protection against selfish slot 
leaders attempting to generate a dishonest block. Should an input endorser find a transaction 
within the questioned block is attempting to complete double-spend and is unfaithful, the slot 
leader is unable to generate the block (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). In PoW, 
we fail to see the same supervision as its block generation ignores communication between 
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nodes in this manner. Next, we will discuss the requirements of stakeholders to be eligible for 
selection to participate, as well as how incentive structure is designed. 
 
3.2e Stakeholder Requirements for Incentive Distribution 
 By removing the need for large-scale investment in computational resources, PoS via 
Ouroborous has less barrier to entry for users within the system to participate as nodes, so 
long as they are present under certain conditions. Cardano believes that the major incentives 
under PoS should be for availability and transaction verification. Participation is indeed 
independent of one’s overall investment in computational resources compared to PoW, but for 
stakeholders to gain incentives for block generation, we must observe these assumptions: 
- One slot before her turn, an elected shareholder will sync and query the current longest 
blockchain and any endorsed inputs (transactions) to be included in the block during her 
slot. 
- She will remain available and online during her elected slot in order to generate the new 
block. 
- In a slot if: 
- The slot falls during the commit stage of the epoch and she is elected to issue the 
VSS commitment (discussed below) 
- The slot falls during the reveal stage of the epoch and she is elected to issue the 
required opening shares and opening to her commitment (discussed below) 
- She will frequently check to see if she is elected for participation in the current or next 
epoch. 
- Be available during her slot assignment of input endorser to process and verify 
transactions to be input to the block. 
 
  Observing these standards for the Ouroboros protocol grant nodes to receive individual 
and pooled rewards from the block generation during which they were on the committee 
(Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). Incentives under the Ouroboros PoS are 
proposed under different options, varying from similar Bitcoin mining rewards to a newer 
concept of communal distribution of rewards for all stakeholders involved (slot leaders and 
input endorsers). While PoW issues coins and transaction fees for a specific new block to the 
node that generated the new block, Cardano has the option to distribute rewards based on 
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individual blocks or during multiple blocks in an epoch. The various reward structures for 
Cardano are offered as follows: 
- Total transaction fees collected from users within a block are issued to the slot 
leader who issued the block (similar to Bitcoin). 
- Total transaction fees collected during a sequence of blocks in an epoch can be 
pooled together and distributed to all shareholders who were active and 
participated in these slots (restaurant splitting tips between servers and busboys at 
the end of multiple shifts). 
- Reward shareholders elected to be committee members for random coin-flipping 
(tipping for creating entropy). 
- Reward input endorsers proportional to however many inputs they managed to 
endorse (commission based concept). 
  
 Users under PoS in varying roles to support the network can earn either active or passive 
incentives so long as they remain synced to the blockchain when required. It is not necessary to 
remain active on the system at all times, therefore reducing the already minimal amount of 
energy required to support PoS compared to PoW nodes. We can now identify the cryptographic 
process by which Ouroboros proves to verify transactions to be input to blocks. 
 
3.2d Commitment and Opening Cryptography for Transaction Approval 
 
 The cryptographic verification process for transactions within Ouroborous can be 
dissected to the phases commitment, reveal and recovery which occur during each epoch. 
Communication to the blockchain network as a whole via the PoS involved in Ouroborous 
allows for the commitment phase to begin. Electors for each slot (i.e. the slot leaders), will 
generate a random value via coin-tossing that is kept secret from others initially on the network. 
This will be known as an elector’s “commitment”, and it contains encrypted transactions from 
the input endorsers and a “proof of secret”.  
 Similar to PoW cryptography, the elector will now sign this commitment with her private 
key, however the commitment will have her public key attached (Rosic, 2018). The benefit in 
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this case is that the public blockchain has evidence of who submitted the commitment (albeit 
anonymous assuming public keys are still unrelated to one’s information), and that the posting 
will also show which epoch it belongs to. Publicly announcing this information provides 
transparency to users and improves overall verification honesty using multiparty communication 
as slot leaders collect other commitments to post along with their blocks to the network. We will 
use Alice and Bob to understand the commitment phase: 
1. Alice will generate her random value via coin-tossing to keep in private from other 
nodes within the network initially. She will package this all into her own “treasure 
chest”, with the locked inside being all encrypted transactions to be posted to her slot 
and a “proof of secret”. This will be known as Alice’s Commitment, and is 
broadcasted to the network with her private key as signature to provide proof that she 
as a slot leader indeed has stake. The blockchain however will see her posted 
commitment with her public key and an indication of the epoch she is committing to, 
which helps to create the reinforce the time aspect of the blockchain. 
 
2. Bob is another slot leader, and will complete the same treasure box process as Alice 
and will eventually post his commitment to the blockchain as well. Alice and Bob are 
participating in multiparty communication as their block endorsements are being 
posted to the public blockchain for verification. 
 
 The reveal stage of Ouroboros deals with elected node participants carrying out their 
responsibility to solve a cryptographic message so that the block should indeed be posted. While 
this mirrors the idea of hashing within PoW, energy consumption is not a concern as the result is 
quite binary. Electors are required during this phase to “reveal” an opening phrase to the 
receivers of their original commitment string (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). The 
inherent assumption is that the elector is being honest to the receiver that her opening value will 
be match the commitment phase message in order to “unlock” the encrypted secret message. So 
long as these two values match, the secret value from the commitment phase for each elector are 
presented as a randomly generated byte seed (Rosic, 2017). Now that the blocks have been 
proven to be valid and post-worthy, we must elect new slot leaders for the following epoch, 
allowing for the high level of internally generated entropy critical to Ouroborous. This seed is 
Hosack 
 
32 
used as the randomness factor within the coin-flipping protocol, and the system returns to the 
beginning to reassess dynamic stake proportions. 
 
Figure 4: The two main stages of Ouroborous protocol for solving for the 
cryptographic seed. We note that in order to preserve dynamic stake, a new 
snapshot of holdings by stakeholders is created to be used along with the 
secret seed to determine the next slot leaders in the following epoch. The G 
block is defined as the genesis block of the next epoch, where the process 
will begin once again and the first completed epoch will be posted to the 
blockchain with all approved slots (courtesy of Kiayias, Russell, David, & 
Oliynykov, 2017). 
 
 Assume that Alice in this case, however, decides to be an honest node while Bob does not 
wish to reveal his opening phase and allow his block to post. The resulting situation is as 
follows: 
1. For her reveal, Alice will post her secret golden key to open her treasure chest, known 
as the opening phrase, to the network. Alice is therefore promising the network that 
she is being honest and that her golden key is the correct key for her specific chest in 
order to get the secret inside. 
 
2. Should Alice be telling the truth, her block is considered to be trusted and worthy to 
be posted to the blockchain. Her and the other electors must now complete the coin 
flipping protocol to determine the next shareholder participants. The proof of secret 
found inside each treasure chest is used as a random byte string to help initiate 
entropy for selections in the following epoch. 
 
3. Bob refuses to give up his golden key, but forgets the system is designed to unlock his 
treasure chest from the inside if nodes cannot have access to the key. This process, 
explained below, allows other honest nodes to post the encrypted shares included in 
Bob’s commitment phase, and slot leaders can back-solve to create a replica key to 
open Bob’s treasure chest. This allows the honest blockchain to be continued even in 
the hands of a dishonest slot leader selection. 
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 However, much like the concern within PoW, let us assume a certain level of dishonest 
nodes are participating in the commitment and opening phase, but refuse to post their opening 
phrase. Essentially, other slot leaders attempting to access the secret in her signed commitment 
would be unable to “unlock” its contents assuming there is no back-end method to check. To 
solve this, Cardano implements the recovery phase which enforces the value of multiparty 
communication via a process called Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) (Kiayias, Russell, David, & 
Oliynykov, 2017). The goal of this section of the protocol is to allow for honest nodes to recover 
the secret message should the adversary not wish to post their opening. This is achieved by 
honest nodes posting the encrypted shares included in the commitment phase and back-solving to 
find the secret phrase. This prohibits the system from falling victim to a malicious slot leader 
attempting to corrupt the verification process (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). 
 
3.2f Defense Against Blockchain Attacks  
 We have significantly discussed the security surrounding the Ouroborous algorithm to 
protect randomness within the network and its election procedure for consensus. Double 
spending is limited due to the presence of multiparty communication within the protocol and by 
devoting the block generation process to proportionality of stake rather than energy mining 
capabilities. Persistence under Ouroboros argues that once an honest node has verified the 
transaction as good to post to the block, no other honest node should disagree. Double spending 
is therefore challenged as the attacker cannot attempt to convince all the nodes to invalidate the 
transaction to recall her value sent (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). 
 A major consideration in PoS based protocols is to address and eliminate the problem 
caused by nothing-at-stake users who attempt to act maliciously within the system. We define 
nothing-at-stake as when dishonest shareholders of the system attempt to create different 
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falsified copies of the blockchain, given the inexpensiveness of computational effort needed to 
run a PoS blockchain (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). In PoW, we see that two 
shareholders could possibly complete these alternative false blockchains for submission if they 
can secure computational power to mint the next n blocks. 
  However, Ouroboros claims their system prohibits this forking ability for hour main 
reasons: amount of time honest nodes are online, Cardano chain selection rule, random entropy 
of the system for subsequent elections, and a mitigation of the “tragedy of the commons” issue 
faced in other PoS systems (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). Since nodes are 
assumed to be online frequently, they will be synced with the most correct blockchain and these 
forks will be avoided. Should they be signing on after an absence, users are also instructed to 
ignore significant forks that may have occurred since their last visit. While the adversary may 
have been able to create the blockchain very quickly and lengthy, honest nodes will follow the 
longest, correct chain in order to have the ability to mint a new block and gain rewards (Kiayias, 
Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). This is supported by the entropy of coin flipping which 
determines the next shareholder elections as attacking nodes have limited ability to predict when 
a given honest node will be assigned to minting the next block, lessening the ability to carry out 
a nothing-at-stake attack.  
 Finally, the “tragedy of the commons” refers to the concept that under other PoS based 
currencies, users may submit themselves to the adversary under fear that they themselves will 
prosper more from joining than from remaining honest. They feel that should they not join the 
attack, they would be presented with a lose-lose scenario in terms of finances invested in the 
system regardless of their allegiance in honesty to the system (Kiayias, Russell, David, & 
Oliynykov, 2017). Yet, under Ouroboros, even if the slot leader or input endorser could act in a 
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dishonest manner, they have no reason to as the reward for completing the correct blockchain 
will most likely be greater than the bribe given to work on the competing chain under nothing-at-
stake. Since users invest equity into the currency in order to improve their proportion of stake for 
election, there is minimal reason to act maliciously, as it could hurt one’s holdings should an 
attack impact the market.  
  Because it is much more difficult and expensive for a dishonest node to control the 
majority of stake in Cardano than it is to obtain high computational power to solve PoW puzzles, 
we consider the ability for a 51% attack under PoS (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 
2017). For a PoW based cryptocurrency, a 51% attack would be achieved under the condition 
that dishonest miners are able to collude and control 51% of the total mining power of the 
network. This would give an advantage to attacking nodes to generate progressive blocks and 
achieve double-spend. A PoS based 51% attack would require adversarial nodes to control the 
majority stake in Cardano, which is considered to be highly unlikely due to cost. However, in the 
rare situation this is achieved, a dishonest group of miners could create a fork of the blockchain, 
which is one that benefits themselves rather than the network. Assuming honest nodes ignore 
these forks, persistence and liveliness can be regained (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 
2017). 
Figure 5: Breakdown of the largest 
mining pools found under Bitcoin 
PoW protocol based on 
computational power. 
Theoretically, should the top 3 
pools decide to become dishonest 
adversaries, they can achieve a 
51% attack on the system. Validity 
of transactions and security against 
double spending are therefore 
violated if this occurs (courtesy of 
Rosic, 2017) 
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 Ouroboros also allows for increased protection from the idea of bribery attacks issued by 
dishonest miners wishing to coerce honest nodes to acting against protocol standards and 
creating false chains. The integrity of the system effectively limits the need for involvement in 
these actions as compared to Bitcoin and PoW due to staking requirements for Cardano block 
generation participation. PoW miners may engage in these bribes for two reasons: no stake is 
required to mine in PoW, and the difference between the bribery amount and block reward 
(Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). Especially as more Bitcoin enters circulation, a 
miner with no financial risk in the currency itself will opt to take a bribery reward to compromise 
the system so long as it exceeds the present value of a PoW block reward and/or transaction fees. 
While unethical, it makes sense for the miner from a financial standpoint should that be their 
main motivation. 
 PoS mitigates bribery attacks by forcing protocol participants to use their stake as 
collateral in order to participate in incentives and verify the blockchain. Dishonest slot leaders 
suffer from not acting according to protocol standards as they are unable to make as much profit 
should their block fail to post. Another angle to this attack would be considering the manner in 
which cryptocurrency markets are set with volatility. Should it become public that there is 
significant dishonest activity on the PoS blockchain, the price of the currency will fall and 
dishonest nodes will lose value/equity in their holdings as a result of their actions (Kiayias, 
Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). Thus, bribery attacks present a lose-lose under Cardano 
unless the bribe offered is enough to outweigh the sum of one’s entire holdings, potential loss 
spread, and plausible earnings from honest block generation incentives. 
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3.2g Limitations and Considerations 
 The initial work and creativity of King and Nadal with Peercoin paved the way for 
blockchain protocol efforts to attempt to solve the energy consumption and related issues with 
PoW. By involving one’s stake as proof to measure the validity of a block rather than 
computational power, energy is conserved and participants are encouraged to remain honest for 
the sake of their invested equity in the coin. Yet, due to the immaturity of PoS algorithm-based 
currencies within the market today, there still are notable limitations and vulnerabilities to 
consider. 
 A main concern among PoS critics is to understand the consequences should the 
assumption of cost to control 51% of the stake is failed from our prior discussion. We assume 
that the price of Cardano and its overall coin circulation will create a cost to own the majority of 
stake as greater than the energy cost to control 51% of computational power in PoW. PoS 
skeptics believe it is more expensive to attack a PoW system such as Bitcoin as dishonest players 
are unable to enter due to the cost of mining that significant amount of energy being greater than 
the amount possible to steal (Rosic, 2017). If this is true and the value of a Cardano coin falls to 
be less than this amount, theoretically an attacker may target a PoS system instead. 
 Much like how the PoW blockchain is dependent on the miners in order to generate new 
blocks for transactions to be posted, Cardano requires that users should frequently query the 
current blockchain and remain online to participate. This also means that of those online for PoS 
under Cardano, the majority is assumed to be honest players compared to adversarial 
stakeholders. Major violation of either of these values could threaten persistence within 
Ouroboros if nodes are not active enough or willing to put their stake in to participate. Some 
users also are omitted or barred from becoming elected should they not meet the minimum 
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amount of stake in Cardano (1% according to Cardano) (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 
2017). Honest users may be left out and substituted for dishonest nodes with more investment 
(stake), or an inability to understand their role as an input endorser or slot leader. 
 
3.2h Transactions per Second (TPS) for Bitcoin vs. Cardano 
 When analyzing the usability of decentralized currency and removing the need for third-
party intervention for transactions, overall transaction approval time is a major concern. 
Recently, increased activity on the Bitcoin market has bogged down transaction time for users as 
compared to speeds recorded by other major cryptocurrencies, and information provided below 
from Blockchain Luxembourg shows the moving average of Transactions per Second (TPS) over 
the last two years (Blockchain.info). The steady TPS for Bitcoin of less than 10 (which is 
generous) over the last two years exhibits the concern for long-term usage as other protocols can 
create products with faster TPS. Bitcoin is stunted in its evolution as it is not managed by any 
developer or group, but rather is standalone and static. In the last month, we observe that TPs has 
dropped to below 5 on average. It is worth noting that Bitcoin, when compared against Cardano 
TPS data, is not totally balanced. Bitcoin functions on a much larger scale than Cardano, and 
Ouroboros was tested on a limited node amount via the Amazon Web Server cloud. 
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Figure 6: TPS data for Bitcoin ranging from May 2016 to present. Average 
performance is observed to be limited to under 7-10 TPS. Extrapolations 
could be during periods of increased node activity/oversaturation of 
transactions awaiting confirmation to a block (courtesy of Blockchain.info). 
 
 Immaturity of the Ouroboros protocol within Cardano speed tests remains to be a 
considered liability when making overall assumptions about the efficiency of the network. As 
mentioned, Ouroboros speed was experimented using varying node activity on the Amazon Web 
Services EC2 Cloud server. Node presence ranged from 10 to 40 throughout these tests, as well 
as altering slot lengths between 5 and 20 seconds (Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). 
The results show a much higher TPS recorded for Cardano on its small-scale deployment. 
Median TPS in the below graph was calculated to be 257.6 for a 40-node test given slot length of 
5 seconds. We must wait to compare TPS with fairness between Cardano and Bitcoin until 
Ouroborous implementation has existed for longer periods of time. 
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Figure 7: TPS data for Ouroboros in limited field test. Median performance 
is observed to be limited to under 257.6 TPS assuming 40 nodes utilizing 5 
second slot times during each epoch. Node amount limited to EC2 server 
constraints (courtesy of Kiayias, Russell, David, & Oliynykov, 2017). 
 
Conclusions 
 
 After analyzing the evolution of Nakomoto’s Bitcoin PoW protocol and cryptocurrency 
efforts in relation to the progress made in PoS protocol, we have identified savings in stake-
based distributed consensus. These benefits are measured by the independence of computational 
power from transactional validity and removing the need for blockchain nodes to actively race to 
gain the potential to mine a new block. Over a long-term, dependence on electricity for 
participation in PoW protocol is inefficient and unstable given the cost to produce power in 
various locations around the world, which also acts as a barrier to entry in some areas where a 
large amount of power is limited. Instead, utilizing one’s stake (s) within a cryptocurrency, such 
as Cardano, theoretically makes more sense for future adoption. Since players use their own 
equity in the coin as proof of transaction verification through a proven random process, there is a 
greater value in protecting the currency and major nothing-at-stake attacks are therefore limited 
in feasbility. Should a node act dishonest and wish to negatively affect the PoS blockchain, the 
coin could lose price value and she would suffer losses in her holdings. Users are also 
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encouraged through this concept to continually invest in the currency as a method to increase 
their stake and probability to be elected for participation in block generation during a given slot. 
Ouroboros and other PoS algorithms that focus on probability of stake or coin-age therefore 
promote the value in a coin even as circulation reaches its limit and rewards are limited, unlike 
Bitcoin and PoW. 
 PoS and its effect on the field as a whole remain to be seen, however, due to immaturity 
on exchanges and a requirement to replace the household name of “Bitcoin”. While it improves 
on many aspects of protecting users from double spending attacks via multiparty communication 
in Cardano and minimizes the need for honest miners to engage in bribery attacks, we still are 
unsure of how it will withstand on large scale deployment. Cardano TPS tests showed significant 
improvement to Bitcoin, albeit on a much smaller and controlled scale. Much of the hype 
surrounding security with PoS also comes from assumptions that 51% attacks are more 
expensive under PoS given it is based on coin value rather than computational energy costs. 
Should this assumption fail, the system is more prone to adversary activity. 
 Overall, it appears that PoS in its seemingly early stages of implementation help to 
provide distributed consensus in alternative cryptocurrencies while minimizing node costs to 
support the network. In the coming years of lessened rewards under Bitcoin PoW protocol and 
possibly rising transaction fees to users as coins approach the circulation limit, cryptocurrency 
users can aim to find value in PoS algorithms for decentralized currencies. 
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